Heschel, A. J., Heavenly Torah
as Reflected through the Generations,
ed. and transl. G. Tucker, NY,
Continuum: 2005. Hardback, xxiv + 814. [1]
For[2]
over 150 years, Jews and Christians have been trying to understand the
worldview of rabbinic Judaism; three approaches have emerged. The earliest
tried to develop a prŽcis of rabbinic thinking. Some of these were patently
anti-rabbinic, judging rabbinic Judaism to be inferior to Christianity; others
were more sympathetic. In all cases, however, the presentation was based on a
unitary reading of the sources; that is, on the assumption that one could read
Mishna, Gemara, midrash, halakha, liturgy, and mystical texts all at once and
affirm that they, together, represented Òrabbinic Judaism.Ó The result was an
authoritative and unitary view of the teachings of the rabbis. The two best
such attempts were by George Foot Moore (non-Jewish and sympathetic) and Efraim
Urbach (Jewish). The categories used by such scholars were an attempt at a
Òsystematic theologyÓ of rabbinic Judaism, dealing with such themes as God,
revelation, prophecy, and so on. The categories of the Mishna itself were
otherwise: seeds, holidays, women, damages, holy things, and purity matters.
Neusner, after a thorough critique
of the systematic theological approach, tried two methods. The first centered
around individual scholars. However, he soon realized that that approach naively
assumed the integrity of the ascriptions; that is, that ÒRabbi X saysÓ meant
that he really said it. So, Neusner developed a theology of books; that is, a
theology of the editors of the discrete books in the rabbinic canon. Later, he
went on to synthesize these theologies into a larger rabbinic worldview. What
is good science, however, has given us a synthesis of a fragmented data base.
It is not really a ÒtheologyÓ of rabbinic Judaism though it is certainly good
history.
Max Kadushin did not use the
systematic or the synthesized fragment approach (he actually wrote before
Neusner). Kadushin took the unitary approach but, instead of arranging the
material in systematic categories, he arranged it by key rabbinic (Hebrew)
terms. He called these terms Òvalue-concepts.Ó By this, Kadushin meant that
each term had a conceptual dimension and, hence, could be discussed but, at the
same time, each term had a normative thrust; that is, each term was also an
Òought,Ó a something one should do (or should not do). Thus, ÒTalmud TorahÓ
(study of Torah) is a concept and one can discuss how many hours one should
study, which texts and in which order, the relative priority of study and
charity, etc. But ÒTalmud TorahÓ is also a value, an activity one ought to do.
So, too, ÒGemilut HasadimÓ (doing good deeds) is a concept that can be defined
and refined and, also, an activity that one should do. The problem with
KadushinÕs analysis was that, as he noted himself, all the Òvalue-conceptsÓ are
mutually implicatory; each implies almost all of the others. As a result, the
system is overly fluid.[3]
HeschelÕs Heavenly Torah uses none of the foregoing three methods. It is not
a study in systematic theology, not an essay in individual rabbis or texts, and
not an analysis of rabbinic terms. Rather, HeschelÕs work is a typology; that
is, it is an attempt to identify two ways of seeing the world from within
rabbinic Judaism and, then, to follow the logic and the texts of these two
views. It has the weakness of the unitary view of rabbinic texts and of the
lack of historical contextualization, but it is a powerful attempt, a real try,
at two theologies of rabbinic Judaism, beginning in the talmudic period and
continuing through the Middle Ages right up into modernity.[4]
HeschelÕs key insight is that there
are two basic rabbinic worldviews. One is rational. It is cool and systematic
in its approach to text, to interpretation, to prayer, to action, etc. The
other is rooted in the religious imagination (though Heschel did not use that
term because of its pejorative content in medieval Jewish philosophy). In his
own language, there is the approach of reason and the approach of vision.
Heschel ascribes the approach of reason to Rabbi Ishmael and the approach of
vision to Rabbi Akiva.[5]
Heschel begins his book with the
portraits of his protagonists. Rabbi Ishmael is the person characterized by
reserve, who shuns the wondrous and favors cool consideration of problems while
Rabbi Akiva is the person who is the poet, the visionary, the one who rouses
the public to action with his fearlessness and who thirsts for the wondrous.
(33-42)
Heschel continues, not with any
ÒsystematicÓ concept, but with exegesis as the central activity of rabbinic
Judaism. How one sees the text and how one handles it is not peripheral but is
the core of oneÕs theology, if one is rabbinic. A series of chapters follow
that deal with centrally rabbinic themes: the tabernacle and the sacrifices,
the Shekhina and divine suffering, human suffering, commandments, duties of the
heart, the language used in Torah, the mystical orchard, the Face of God and
MosesÕ experience of God, GodÕs Glory, etc. In dealing with each of these
themes, Heschel identifies and contrasts the approaches of Rabbi Ishmael and
Rabbi Akiva; that is, he presents the rational and the visionary view of these
themes.
Abraham Joshua Heschel was such a
poet and wrote so beautifully that I think he would not approve, but I shall do
it anyway. The following chart contrasts these two rabbinic worldviews on ten
of the themes Heschel deals with:
|
THEME |
RATIONAL SCHOOL |
VISIONARY SCHOOL |
|
ÒEvery jot and tittleÓ |
Are irrelevant because God spoke
in terms humans could understand |
Can be interpreted because every
sign is an act of revelation by God |
|
ÒLaws given to Moses at SinaiÓ
(that are not in the Torah) |
They have authoritative status
but are not revealed |
One must find a textual peg on
which to hang such rules; they are revealed |
|
The tabernacle |
Was given to help people ward off
idol worship |
Was intended as the earthly abode
of God |
|
Sacrifices and Worship |
Done as an act of obedience to
GodÕs will (for the sake of humans) |
God desires the sweet smell and
prayers of His people (for GodÕs sake) |
|
Shekhina |
Represents GodÕs omnipresence |
Is GodÕs empathetic presence;
hence it suffers; e.g., goes into exile with the people and will be redeemed
with it |
|
Good deeds |
Are ethical commandments |
Are means to cleave to God |
|
ÒPut God before you alwaysÓ |
Direct your thoughts to heaven |
Sense GodÕs living presence |
|
Deed and study |
Deed more important because it is
a concrete act of obedience |
Study more important because it
is the living word of the living God |
|
Face, Glory, Back of God |
Are metaphors |
Represent different intense
experiences of God |
|
Human suffering |
Is a decree of God to be accepted
in faith |
Has the purpose of ulterior
reward in this world or the next |
Having created the chart, I am
pleased that it may make clear to the reader what HeschelÕs view of the two
major trends in rabbinic Judaism are. I am, however, deeply embarrassed because
the chart deprives the reader of the deep subtlety of the original texts and
the equally subtle and poetic reading of those texts by Heschel. The reader has
lost the interpretive innovations, the play on words, the ÒrabbinizingÓ of the
biblical texts, the dyadic poetry of HeschelÕs presentation, and much more.
There is no substitute for engagement with the texts, and the texts on texts,
not even in a clear chart.
These worldviews are not, as
Heschel sees it, mutually exclusive; rather, they supplement one another,
maintaining a healthy tension within rabbinic Judaism. ÒIt is necessary to
shift viewpoints from time to time to see the fullness of reality.Ó (709)
ÒManifold visionÓ and the Òcomplementarity of reason and visionÓ are what is
needed.[6]
(712)
Finally Heschel, as Tucker
suggests, was not just writing a theology of rabbinic Judaism. Himself a Òbrand
plucked from the fireÓ of nazism, Heschel was, as he always did, addressing the
contemporary post-shoah Jewish community. His message (not sufficiently spelled
out either by himself or by Tucker) seems to me to be twofold. [7]
On the subject of GodÕs part in the
shoah, Heschel accepted the view of Rabbi Akiva: ÒThe Holy and Blessed One is a
partner in the suffering of His creatures; He is involved in the lot of His
people, wounded by their sufferings and redeemed by their liberation. This
response constitutes a sublimation of human suffering. It elevates the mystery
of suffering above and beyond the human realm, and seeks to nullify the
afflictions of mortals before the afflictions of HeavenÉ the Holy and Blessed
One invites Israel to share His sufferingÉ. This doctrine is one of lament and
woe, but it is a lament that contains great comfort.Ó (120-21) For Heschel, God
in the post-shoah period is affirmed as the suffering God. I have disagreed
with our teacher and master but his theology is stated here very clearly. [8]
On the subject of Jewish society
after the shoah, Heschel saw that the visionary approach of Rabbi Akiva was
needed but he realized that, as Tucker puts it, the Òmore humanistic and
pluralisticÓ approach to text and exegesis of Rabbi Ishmael was also needed:
ÒThere never arose in Israel any Sage who so imprinted his characteristic stamp
on Judaism as did Rabbi AkivaÉ. And yet it seems to me that the hour demands
the teachings of Rabbi IshmaelÉ.Ó (707)
Susannah Heschel in her touching
Foreword notes that the years of writing Heavenly Torah were among the happiest of HeschelÕs life. The
material flowed from him. He knew he was writing a sefer, a work of religious inspiration, in the tradition of
his hasidic ancestors. This book is surely that. Within the Heschelian corpus, Heavenly
Torah is HeschelÕs work on rabbinic
Judaism, from the talmudic period through the Middle Ages and into modernity,
just as The Prophets is HeschelÕs
magnum opus on biblical Judaism, God
in Search of Man is his chief work on philosophy, and The Insecurity
of Freedom is his major statement on
religious ethics. HeschelÕs scholarship, especially in Heavenly Torah,
is stupendous; I think it is probably unmatched.[9]
One need only study pages 118-21 on divine suffering and GodÕs need for humans
to make atonement for Him to see Heschel at his deepest, spiritually and
intellectually. This book is a tour de force not only in its conception of the material but in
its mastery thereof.
A word about the translation and
commentary: TuckerÕs own scholarship and learning shine through the whole work.
Again and again, his notes and explanations spell out the elliptical rabbinic
texts as well as HeschelÕs elliptical handling of those texts. Even learned
colleagues will need his notes. Further, the translation has a beauty of its
own. Tucker has gone to great lengths to capture the poetry of HeschelÕs
language, taking great pains even to explain HeschelÕs Hebrew usages and
allusions. This is a learned and poetic translation and commentary, to a very
learned and poetic interpretation, of an even more learned and poetic body of
literature. This classic will be with us a long time.
[1] This review essay appeared in Reviews in Theology
and Religion, 13:1 (February 2006)
136-41.
[2] As a matter of full disclosure, I note that I never
studied with Heschel though I did work with him on the Clergy Concerned about
the War in Vietnam. I have, however, faithfully read much of his work and
consider myself a disciple. Further, I have known Gordon Tucker for many years
as a friend and colleague.
[3] For an exposition of KadushinÕs value-concepts, see
my The Banality of Good and Evil
(Georgetown University Press: 1999) chaps. 7 and 10. See especially the section there on secular and humanist
value-concepts such as Òliberty, democracy,Ó etc.
[4] Others who have written on the rabbinic worldview,
including Moore, Neusner, Kadushin, and Urbach do not have HeschelÕs ease with
the medieval philosophic and kabbalistic traditions that Heschel consistently
brings into this study. Further, while these theologies of rabbinic Judaism
were being written, a veritable industry grew up which produced critical texts
and reconstructed the social and political history of rabbinic Judaism. This
work is not relevant here.
[5] As Tucker notes in many places, Heschel ÒoverreachedÓ
in his assigning of texts and followers to each of these schools – which
does not change the power of the typology at all.
[6] Heschel confused the approach which Òshifts
viewpointsÓ with the one which tries to do both at once. See my Facing the
Abusing God: A Theology of Protest
(Westminster / John Knox: 1993), chapter 5, where I have argued in favor of the
ÒshiftingÓ approach.
[7] The word ÒholocaustÓ is not appropriate for the event
it refers to because of its meaning as a wholly burnt sacrifice. Further, since
the event occurred to Jews, it is in their language that the event should be referred
to; hence, ÒshoahÓ (Òterribly destructive stormÓ). As a word of horror in
Jewish history and consciousness, it should never be capitalized.
[8] See my Facing the Abusing God: A Theology of
Protest, where I follow Heschel in
chapters 2, 3, and 5 but disagree with him in chapters 16-18.
[9] Did Heschel really have this whole corpus in his
head? I have known men who knew the whole Talmud and its commentaries by heart
but I have not know of anyone who had a similar command over the midrashic
material as well.